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Abstract:
Legislation as a way to regulate personal status matters has — over the period
considered — come to embody the chief mode of (legal) reform of personal status.
While recognising its tremendous impetus, this paper interrogates the very form of
collective decision-making that legislation signifies, its operationalisation in
adjudication, and its interrelation with popular culture. The three contributors
identify some of the areas where these dynamics have surfaced in their experiences as
both academics and practitioners and consider the Egyptian legal system, which is
meant to function as a case study rather than a normative model. To appreciate the
functioning of collective decision-making on matters of personal status, Nadia
Sonneveld focuses on the different approach of the state towards the regulation of
personal status for its Muslim and non-Muslim citizens. The ‘best interests of the child’
is the lens through which Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron illustrates the multiple
entanglements of legislation and its eventual actualisation in Egyptian courts. Enas
Lotfy discusses the classical examples of Egyptian cinema that are popularly
associated with changes in legislation and underlines how the big screen in Egypt has
often been the place where some of the most contentious and divisive matters of
personal status have been discussed before (or away from) legislative intervention.
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General Introduction
Gianluca Parolin
An anniversary provides a good opportunity to sit back and reflect on both
accomplishments and challenges, and a centennial even more so. The end of the
second decade of the twentieth century marked the beginning of sustained state
interventions in the domain of personal status in the Arab world. The first of these was
a set of modest reforms introduced by the Ottoman Law of Family Rights of 1917 and
the Egyptian Law 25 of 1920. A century later, we asked three prominent contributors
to lay the foundations of a reflection on the enormous transformations that have
occurred in these 100 years in anticipation of a wider discussion, which we hope will
take the form of a symposium.
Legislation as a way to regulate matters of personal status is certainly a formidable
innovation, and — over the period considered — it has come to embody the chief mode
of (legal) reform of personal status. While recognising its tremendous impetus, we
want to interrogate the very form of collective decision-making that legislation
signifies, its operationalisation in adjudication, and its interrelation with popular
culture. Our three distinguished contributors provide us with insightful entry points
into these questions by identifying some of the areas where these dynamics have
surfaced in their experiences as both academics and practitioners. The legal system
that all three contributions consider is that of Egypt, which is meant to function as a
case study rather than a normative model.
In order to appreciate the functioning of collective decision-making on matters of
personal status, Nadia Sonneveld brings to our attention the different approaches
of the state towards the regulation of personal status for its Muslim and non-Muslim
citizens. While this epitomises a distinct differential relation between the state and its
Muslim and non-Muslim populations, the author offers us a parallel reading of
reforms of personal status matters for Egypt’s two largest denominations: Sunni
Muslims and Coptic Christians. The span of a century — divided by the author into
three phases — allows us fully to grasp how reforms for these two groups of citizens
followed trajectories that can hardly be described as parallel. The author’s parallel
analysis, however, aptly foregrounds the question of collective decision-making
(legislation) as an instrument of reform in matters of personal status when, for a
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sizeable section of the population, these reforms do not even take the form of state
legislation.
The ‘best interests of the child’ is the lens through which Nathalie BernardMaugiron illustrates the multiple entanglements of legislation and its eventual
actualisation in Egyptian courts. Although the ‘best interests of the child’ made their
appearance in Egyptian legislation and were even consecrated in the 2014
Constitution, the author notes how judges tend to read the previous regulations as a
perfect incarnation of these new, undefined ‘best interests of the child’, effectively
neutralising the legislative reform. Both judges and litigants engage with matters of
custody and visitation in terms of rights claimed either by the child’s mother or father,
while the child and its ‘best interests’ recede into the background. In this endeavour,
the author notes that both judges and litigants mobilise references that range from
classical fiqh all the way to international law. In the context of this established case
law, the author presents and analyses two cases in which the presiding judges decided
to deviate from the standard construction of the ‘best interests of the child’ so as to
accommodate visitation rights and even overnight visitation to the non-custodial
parent.
Besides discussing the classical examples of Egyptian cinema that are popularly
associated with changes in legislation, Enas Lotfy underlines how the big screen in
Egypt has often been the place where some of the most contentious and divisive
matters of personal status have been discussed before (or away from) legislative
intervention. Comedy, in particular, seems to emerge as a very welcoming and fecund
genre for critical societal discussions. Some of the more contentious and divisive
matters appear to be addressed in comedic films, including one whose story and script
was authored by our contributor: *Bashtarī Rāǧil [A Man Wanted, 2017]. The
Egyptian celebrities starring in it and its comedic style brought a wide audience to
engage with a very delicate subject in contemporary Egypt: a woman’s desire for
maternity while refusing marriage. The author further elaborates on her own
experience as a screenwriter in relation to topical social issues such as matters of
personal status.
It is our sincere hope that you will enjoy the richness of these first reflections that our
illustrious contributors have kindly shared with us, and that you will also later join us
in the symposium dedicated to One Hundred Years of Family Law Reform in
Parliament, in Court, and on Screen.

5

Making Up the Balance: A Century of Muslim and
Coptic Family Law Reform in Egypt
Nadia Sonneveld

Introduction
In 1920, when Egypt was still a British protectorate (1914–1922), a committee of
religious and legal scholars introduced Egypt’s first codified family law (Law No.
25/1920). The law was considered a landmark development, both in Egypt and the
wider Muslim world. This and subsequent Egyptian family law reforms received much
scholarly attention. In many studies, the predominant focus is on the position of
women and how religious laws impact on their lives. Relatedly, scholars often ask
whether the reforms led to social change and gender equality. One hundred years of
family law reforms looks like a good moment to reflect on these questions. I, however,
propose to use the occasion to assess the biases in the field and advocate for a more
holistic approach to the study of religion-based family law. By moving beyond the
almost exclusive focus on Muslim women, and including in our analyses neglected
groups, such as men, migrants, non-Muslims, and people with physical and mental
disabilities, we can make up for the fact that an important part of empirical reality has
remained under-studied.
Both in feminist and sociological literature, family law policy is frequently used to
measure the extent to which states are committed to gender equality (Sonneveld 2017:
89). Gender equality is at the heart of human rights and stipulated in universal human
rights treaties, such as the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (hereafter: CEDAW). However, while CEDAW applies
to women worldwide, there is an over-emphasis on Muslim women and gender
inequality within Islamic religion, despite the fact that various family laws of Jews and
Christians in the Middle East and North Africa (hereafter: MENA) region also
discriminate on the basis of gender.
A good example is the draft of a unified personal status law (hereafter: PSL) for
Egyptian non-Muslims, which the religious representatives of the Catholic, Protestant
and Orthodox communities in Egypt composed and discussed in 1978 and again in
1998 and 2010, under the leadership of the late Coptic Orthodox Pope Shenouda III.
This draft contains a number of provisions which undermine gender equality. For
instance, a wife must obey her husband in all that is related to his marital rights and
respect her obligations towards her home, and a husband can forbid his wife from
6

studying or working outside the home in case of interference with the interests of the
children or the management of the household (Bernard-Maugiron 2011: 383).
In a study on family law reform in Jordan and Morocco, Engelcke aptly remarks that
“whereas shari‘a court judges … have attended CEDAW meetings … and hold strong
views on CEDAW, church court judges in Jordan stated that they had never been
confronted with CEDAW and that there was simply no pressure to reform” (2019:
239). Moreover, “… a Jordanian shari‘a judge criticized that Islamic law and shari‘a
courts in general are often under the microscope of the international community,
especially international bodies like CEDAW”, whereas the Christians courts “can do
whatever they want” (ibid.). This interview fragment clearly shows the preoccupation
of the international (donor) community with Islamic religion and gender equality,
both in Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority contexts. To a large extent, the same
applies to academic scholarship, despite the fact that a growing number of scholars
engage in the study of non-Muslim family law reform, as we will see below. The strong
preoccupation of academic scholarship with Muslim women has obscured ways in
which governments, religious authorities, legal professionals, and citizens in the
Muslim-majority countries of the Middle East deal with the rights of non-Muslims in
the field of family law. How can governments and other relevant actors guarantee the
rights of minorities to religious freedom while also ensuring equality and
accountability before the law? This question does not exclusively pertain to
governments in the MENA but is also debated in countries where Muslims form a
minority (e.g. Bano 2012; Van Eijk 2019).
Elsewhere, my colleagues and I focus on the way Muslim men (e.g. Sonneveld and
Lindbekk 2015; De Hart, Sonneveld, Sportel 2017; Sonneveld 2017) and migrants (e.g.
Sonneveld and Alagha 2020; Sonneveld 2021) in the MENA relate to religion-based
family laws. Building on the work of a small but growing body of academic scholarship
committed to studying non-Muslim family laws in Egypt (e.g. Tadros 2009; Rowberry
and Khalil 2010; Shaham 2010; Bernard-Maugiron 2011; Lindbekk 2014; Elsässer
2019; Scott 2020), Syria (Van Eijk 2016) and Jordan (Engelcke 2019), I focus in this
paper on a comparison of the divorce rights of religious minorities. In the context of a
century of PSL reform in Egypt I ask specifically how Coptic Orthodox PSL has
developed in comparison to Muslim PSL and how differences and similarities can be
explained. There are very few studies making a comparative analysis of Muslim and
non-Muslim PSL. The only exception that comes to my mind is Van Eijk’s study on the
implementation of Muslim and Catholic PSL in the shari‘a and Catholic courthouses
of Syria (2016).
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The following analysis is based on a review of the literature and is informed by
fieldwork experiences in Egypt but is by no means exhaustive. In fact, more empirical
fieldwork and historical research are needed to obtain detailed knowledge of the ways
in which non-Muslim PSL reform was and is carried out and implemented in practice,
and how it relates to PSL developments within the majority population.
This paper proceeds as follows; section one provides a brief introduction into religionbased family law in Egypt. Then in what follows, I compare the development of Muslim
and Coptic family law1 in Egypt in the period between 1920 and 1955 (section two);
1955–1971 (section three); and 1971–2008 (section four). In addition to providing an
answer to the main question, in the conclusion I also briefly consider whether we can
use the Egyptian case, in which Muslims form a majority and Christians a minority, to
understand developments in religious authority and Muslim family law in contexts
where Muslims form a minority.

1. Religion-based family law in Egypt
The Middle East is the cradle of Christianity and today Christians still form a sizeable
minority group. In Egypt, Saint Mark is believed to have established Christianity
around 40 CE. He is revered as the first Patriarch of the Coptic Orthodox church. The
Islamic conquest of Egypt took place between 639 and 646 CE, ending centuries of
Roman and Byzantine rule. In the centuries that followed many Copts converted to
Islam. During the period of British domination, Roman Catholic and Protestant
missionary organisations tried to convert Copts, Jews, and, to a lesser extent, Muslims,
to Catholicism and Protestantism without much success. It is not easy to estimate the
current number of Christians in Egypt, due to the sensitivity surrounding the subject,
but estimates run from 5 to 15 percent of the population. Egyptian Copts present by
far the largest Christian community in Egypt, and the MENA region in general
(Rowberry and Khalil 2010: 82). Other countries with sizeable Christian communities
are Lebanon, Syria, and, to a lesser extent, Jordan and Iraq.2
The religious diversity of the region is reflected in family law, by and large, the only
field of law that is still religion-based.3 At least on the level of substantial law, Muslim,

1 In this paper, I use the terms Personal Status Law (PSL) and family law interchangeably.
2 If we include Christian migrants living in the MENA region, then Gulf countries, such as the United
Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and even Saudi Arabia, also have sizeable Christian
communities.
3 In the 1970s a process of religious resurgence started in many a Muslim-majority country. In some
countries it led to Islamisation of the legal system. For example, in Egypt, a new constitutional decree
(Art. 2) declared the principles of Islamic shari‘a to be a (1971) and the (1980) main source of
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Christian, and Jewish communities are governed in their familial matters by their own
laws. For instance, in Syria there are five laws of marriage and divorce for Christians,4
one for Muslims, one for Druze, and one for Jews. In Lebanon the situation is even
more diverse; out of eighteen officially recognised religious groups, fifteen religious
PSLs and courts are applicable.5 In Egypt, among the fifteen recognised religious
communities, nine religious family laws on marriage and divorce are applicable: one
for Muslims, six for Christians, and two for Jews (Berger 2005: 394; 400–401).6 On
the level of procedural law, the situation differs as, in numerous countries such as
Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt, the religious courts were abolished and their jurisdiction
transferred to civil courts where secular-trained judges handle family issues according
to unified state laws. Some notable exceptions are Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria, where
the religious courts still exist (Van Eijk 2016; Clarke 2018; Engelcke 2019). Below, I
analyse how Coptic-Orthodox family law has developed in comparison to Muslim
family law.

2. The reform of Muslim and Coptic family law compared:
1920–1955
In 1920, when the Egyptian government introduced its first codified Muslim family
law, the legal system had been through a period of significant changes. During the
Tanzimat period (1839–1876), codification had started in the Ottoman Empire, of
which Egypt was officially a part. In 1882, the British continued the process of
codification, which served two main goals: introduction of Western law (e.g., civil law,
commercial law, penal law, procedural law), and modernisation of religious law,
mostly family law (Peters 2002: 88). As far as we know, the modernisation of family
law mostly left non-Muslim family law untouched, and Egypt’s Coptic clergy retained
legislative and judicial autonomy in the field of PSL, at least until 1874. By and large,
this situation had prevailed for more than a millennium; after the Arab conquest of
Egypt in 639 CE, the new Muslim rulers allowed the Coptic Church to continue

legislation. Other countries went further and Islamised parts of criminal law (e.g., Libya, Pakistan,
Aceh/Indonesia).
4 These are the laws of the Greek-Orthodox; Syriac-Orthodox; Armenian-Orthodox; Catholic; and
Protestant communities (Van Eijk 2016).
5 These are the Alawi; Armenian Catholic; Armenian Orthodox; Assyrian Church of the East;
Chaldean Catholic; Copts; Druze; Evangelical (Protestant); Greek Catholic; Greek Orthodox; Isma‘ili;
Latin Catholic; Jewish; Maronite; Shi‘a; Sunni; Syriac Catholic; and Syriac Orthodox.
6 These are the laws of the Coptic-Orthodox; Greek-Orthodox; Syrian-Orthodox; Armenian-Orthodox;
Catholic; and Protestant communities.
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exercising control over family law affairs (Berger 2005: 400–401; Rowberry and Khalil
2010: 99–100).
Prior to 1920, Muslim women could only divorce for limited reasons, which were
difficult to prove. Based on the teachings of the official school of Islamic jurisprudence
(fiqh) in Egypt, the Hanafi school, marriages could only be terminated by women on
grounds of adultery, death, apostasy, impotence, and prolonged absence of the
husband for more than 90 years. In practice, qadis (judges) often granted women
divorce on a variety of grounds, as studies of Ottoman court records show (e.g., Tucker,
1998). Little information is available on divorce practices among Coptic men and
women. Sources suggest that before 1238 Coptic laws only allowed termination of
marriage in the case of adultery and death (Rowberry and Khalil 2010). In practice,
however, divorce rules were not strictly followed by laity or the clergy (ibid.). Coptic
regulations on familial issues were codified in 1238 in the so-called Nomocanon. The
Nomocanon expanded the official grounds for divorce considerably as we will see
below. What happened in the practice of the Coptic courts remains obscure, at least
until the nineteenth century, and needs further archival research (Rowberry and Khalil
2010: 116–117). Given that the Nomocanon was the basis of ecclesial law for Copts in
Egypt, it is tempting to believe that Coptic men and women had various possibilities
for divorce. However, based on Ottoman shari‘a court records, Afifi shows that many
Copts — and Jews — across the class spectrum, contracted marriages and divorces in
the shari‘a courts (1996). “… Copts took from the shari‘a what suited their needs
without accepting the shari‘a itself” (ibid.: 207). Figuring most prominently was easy
divorce based on talaq (repudiation) (ibid.: 205–207).
At the start of the twentieth century, Egyptian nationalists, such as Qasim Amin and
Muhammad ‘Abduh, increasingly proclaimed that the liberation of the nation from
British domination depended on the liberation of (Muslim) women. They argued that
the family, the cornerstone of society, was threatened by high divorce rates, in great
majority caused by easy and excessive use of the talaq by Muslim, and sometimes also
Coptic, husbands. Both Qasim Amin and Muhammad ‘Abduh were active in the legal
profession; Qasim Amin worked as a judge and Muhammad ‘Abduh was a judge before
he was appointed Mufti of Egypt in 1899 (Ziadeh 1968: 38). In his capacity as Mufti,
‘Abduh received a letter from the Minister of Justice requesting a fatwa (religious
opinion) on divorce opportunities for the many women who had complained to him of
their miserable conditions after their husbands were sentenced to hard labour for life
or other long prison terms. These women were unable to divorce husbands who could
no longer provide for them. ‘Abduh suggested adopting provisions from the Maliki
school of Islamic jurisprudence, which provides more grounds for divorce (Amin 2001:
201). To put a stop to the high divorce rate, ‘Abduh and Amin advocated procedural
requirements to curtail the right of Muslim men to divorce. The 1920 PSL reform
10

indeed curtailed husbands’ divorce rights and expanded women’s rights. A repudiation
pronounced by a husband who is intoxicated or under duress was declared ineffective
in 1929 (Art. 1 of PSL No. 25/ 1929). Additionally, the triple talaq, in which the
husband utters the repudiation three times in one sitting, counted, and still counts, as
only one (ibid.: Art. 3). The PSLs of 1920 and 1929 gave women several new grounds
for divorce. These were, and still are, the husband’s absence without legitimate cause
for a period exceeding one year (Art. 12 of PSL No. 25/1929); his imprisonment for a
period exceeding three years (Art. 14 of PSL No. 25/1929); his mental illness or grave
and incurable sickness, about which the wife had no knowledge at the time of the
marriage (Art. 9 of PSL No. 25/1929); his failure to provide maintenance; or his
harming of his wife (Art. 6 of PSL No. 25/1929; amended by PSL No. 100/1985). While
codification of Muslim family law gave Muslim women more possibilities for
terminating their marriages in the shari‘a courts, at least in theory, it would take
almost another twenty years for the codification of Coptic family law to take place.
In 1855, Sa‘id Pasha, the wāli of Egypt and Sudan from 1854 until 1863, granted Copts
equal citizenship rights. Initially, governance of the Coptic Church over PSL affairs was
preserved, but this changed in 1874 when, in response to petitions by lay Copts penned
by Butrus Ghali Pasha a khedivial decree was issued to allow lay Copts to form a socalled al-Maǧlis al-Millī, a Coptic Community Council. The council was composed of
twelve members and twelve deputy members and tasked with assisting the Coptic
clergy in administrative and financial matters. The council also obtained the authority
to adjudicate in PSL cases (Rowberry and Khalil 2010: 117. See also Shaham 2010:
410) in al-Maǧlis al-Millī courts. In this new situation of shared governance, tensions
frequently arose between church leaders and members of the Council, among others
in 1938.
After pressure from the Egyptian government, which demanded that all religious
communities codify and publish their procedural and substantive rules, the Coptic
Community Council presented a PSL to the government in May 1938, which was
implemented in July 1938 (Shaham 2010: 411). The law included nine divorce grounds
for men and women: adultery (Art. 50); conversion to another religion (Art. 51);
prolonged absence of more than five years (Art. 52); imprisonment of more than seven
years (Art. 53); mental illness, a contagious illness, or impotence (Art. 54); serious
domestic violence (Art. 55); separation due to untenable marriage conditions of more
than three years or immoral or debauched behaviour (Art. 56); incompatibility (Art.
57); and joining a monastic order (Art. 58) (Shaham 2010: 411; Bernard-Maugiron
2011: 363). The divorce grounds were in line with Coptic teachings as contained in the
translated version of the Nomocanon. Compiled in 1238, the Nomocanon forms the
basis of ecclesial law for Coptic Orthodox Egyptians (Rowberry and Khalil 2010: 106).
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Except for some religion-specific grounds, the new grounds for divorce also resembled
the Muslim ones to a great extent, and future historical research should establish on
what sources the 1938 PSL was based. Later, Pope Shenouda III (r. 1971–2012) clearly
considered the amendments to be a deviation from the sources of Coptic law (i.e., the
New Testament) and argued that they were imposed on Copts by lay persons who were
inspired by reforms in Egyptian Muslim family law and whose only wish was to fulfil
their own desires and lust (Shaham 2010: 409).
On the level of practice, al-Maǧlis al-Millī courts were responsible for implementing
the codified divorce provisions. Church leaders resented the liberal attitude of the
Coptic Community Council and in 1945, Pope Macarius III claimed that the only
grounds for divorce were adultery and death, as based on the teachings of Christ and
Peter in the New Testament. Subsequent patriarchs confirmed Macarius’
interpretation in 1962 and 1971 (Rowberry and Khalil 2010: 118). Shaham states that
since the government had ratified the 1938 law, Coptic religious leaders had no choice
but to accept divorce rulings made by the national courts and to allow divorced men
and women to remarry (2010: 412). Further archival research should determine to
what extent divorce petitions were actually granted, whether church leaders attempted
to interfere in the affairs of al-Maǧlis al-Millī courts, and whether they had the power
to deny remarriage. According to Afifi, Coptic “champions of divorce” publicly
complained in the 1940s and 1950s that only the divorce requests of those who were
able to pay large bribes were granted. Claiming that both priests and the Coptic
Community Council engaged in these practices, they asked the state to intervene
(1996: 210).
Whatever the case, given the complicated situation surrounding divorce, Coptic men
frequently recorded divorce in a sharīʿa court (see above) or converted to Islam to
obtain an easy divorce, and in some cases, easy custody of children (Berger 2005: 401;
Wakin 2000; Rowberry and Khalil 2010).7 Influential Coptic lawyers, such as Farid
Antoun, considered these ‘conversions for convenience’ a threat to the stability of the
Coptic community. As a member of the committee responsible for drafting a new
constitution for the Naguib regime (r. 1953–1954), Antoun proposed in one of the
meetings “a single marriage and divorce law for all Egyptians to replace the religiouslyconstructed legal mosaic” (Wakin 2000: 84) alongside the abolition of polygamy and
severe restriction to divorce (ibid.) to put an end to the two main enticements for Copts
to change religion (Ziadeh 1968: 114). The prospects for the introduction of a unified
7 During my many visits to Egypt, I frequently listened to the stories of men and women who had
converted to Islam to divorce their spouse. Sometimes men divorced their Coptic wives, in other cases
they married a second wife, as Muslim men in Egypt have a legal right to marry up to four wives.
Although onerous, some men and women converted back to Coptic Christianity after their divorce.
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PSL for non-Muslims looked promising when socialist army officer Jamal ‘Abd alNasser came to power in 1954.

3. The reform of Muslim and Coptic family law compared:
1955–1971
Under the presidency of Nasser (r. 1954–1970), Law No. 462/1955 was issued. The law
brought three important changes: legislative autonomy of non-Muslim communities
in alimony, guardianship, and inheritance matters was abolished and they became
part of the general law (i.e., Muslim family law); in mixed marriages, Muslim family
law would apply; the religious courts as well as the al-Maǧlis al-Millī courts were
abolished, and both Islamic and Coptic religious authorities lost judicial autonomy
(e.g., Linant de Bellefonds 1956). Before 1955, judges affiliated to the Coptic
Community Council had been responsible for dispensing justice in Coptic family law
issues, and after 1955 they were replaced by judges who were mostly Muslim, and who
would administer the rules for both Copts and Muslims. According to Wakin, the
judges of the former shari‘a courts were incorporated in the new civil court system,
while the judges of the Christian courts were “put on the shelf” (2000: 89). Further
research should establish to what extent this happened and why, and what the
educational background of the Muslim and Christian family court judges was at the
time of the disappearance of the religious courts. One thing is certain: Coptic religious
leaders who had resented the judicial autonomy of the Coptic Community Council
judges in applying what they considered to be the “liberal” 1938 law, were now
confronted with a situation where Coptic family issues were litigated in national courts
by secular-trained judges, most of whom were Muslim.
On the level of substantive law, Copts lost the right to apply the alimony, guardianship,
and inheritance rules of their own community. With regard to marriage and divorce,
however, nothing changed. Where, a few years earlier, lawyer Antoun had suggested
the introduction of a unified marriage and divorce code applying to all non-Muslims,
the Nasser regime decided otherwise for reasons that still require more research. The
memorandum to the 1955 law states that the right of any group of Egyptians, whether
Muslim or non-Muslim, in the application of its law should not be violated (Ziadeh
1968: 115). In 1962, Nasser gave in to demands of the Coptic Church to abolish the
Community Councils. Subsequently, Coptic church leaders wrote a draft law in which
the grounds for divorce were reduced to adultery only. The draft was presented to
different ministers of Justice but was rejected (Shahim 2010: 412). Sezgin (2013: 172)
argues that Nasser did not regard the reform of substantive PSL important, as his main
aim was unification of state power, and bringing religious authorities under state
control was an important element. This applied to the PSLs of non-Muslims as well as
Muslims. As Bernard-Maugiron and Dupret state, the “reformist momentum in the
13

field of personal status was interrupted and relegated to the domain of questions of
secondary importance when the Arab Republic of Egypt was declared in 1952” (2002:
2). It was only after the death of Nasser in 1970 that the reform of Muslim PSL was
taken out of the closet again.
After the defeat of Egypt in the Six Day War against Israel, the country experienced a
surge of religious awakening, with both Muslims and Christians feeling that the defeat
in the war was a punishment of God for a people who deviated from the true path of
religion (Afifi 1996: 214). While under Nasser the country had gone through a phase
of secularism and socialism, and after his death in 1970 his successor, Anwar al-Sadat
(r. 1970–1981), released a great number of Islamists who had been imprisoned under
Nasser. He also introduced a new clause in the constitution, which turned the
principles (mabādiʾ) of Islamic shari‘a into a main source of legislation in September
1971 and the main source of legislation in 1980. In this way, Sadat tried to engage with
the new religious mood of the Muslim population, while simultaneously trying to do
away with leftist and socialist political trends in the country. Around the same time,
following the death of Coptic Pope Cyril VI in March 1971, Shenouda III of Alexandria
was elected and consecrated as the new patriarch of the Orthodox Coptic church in
November 1971. During his long papacy, which ended with his death in March 2012,
he was responsible for introducing a number of important changes. In what allegedly
was a strongly felt need to stabilise the Coptic family in the midst of a wave of Islamic
awakening and what seemed the start of the Islamisation of the legal system, the Pope
followed the lead of his two predecessors in taking a strong stance against the
expansion of divorce grounds introduced by the Coptic Community Council in 1938.
He issued a Papal decree (Decree No. 7) in which he instructed the Coptic clergy to
allow only people who had divorced on the grounds of adultery to remarry (Rowberry
and Khalil 2010: 120; Shaham 2010:413). Referring to a verse from the New
Testament, he said: “But I say unto you, That whosoever shall put away his wife,
saving for the cause of fornication, causeth her to commit adultery: and whosoever
shall marry her that is divorced committeth adultery” (Matt. 5:32, KJV) (Lindbekk
2014: 179). In the early 2000s, a Coptic male litigant, who had been divorced by the
court but was denied permission to remarry by the Coptic Church, took the matter to
an appeal court. In 2006, Cairo’s Administrative Court ruled in his favour. In response
to Pope Shenouda’s appeal, Egypt’s High Administrative Court upheld the decision of
the Administrative Court in March 2008, a decision which was firmly rejected by the
Pope (Bernard-Maugiron 2011: 365–368). A few months later, in June 2008, the 1938
PSL was amended (ibid: 369).
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4. The reform of Muslim and Coptic family law compared: 1971–
2008
Despite the constitutional amendment that turned the principles of Islamic shari‘a into
the main source of legislation, as well as proposals by al-Azhar to introduce the ḥudūd
punishments, the 1970s were also a period of increased exposure to the outside world.
This led to a growing influence of international (donor) organisations and, coupled
with domestic pressure to improve the rights of women, the need to reform Egyptian
Muslim family law grew. An important figure in the reform process was Aisha Rateb,
a law graduate from Cairo University. She had wanted to become a judge in 1949 but
her application was turned down by the State Council (an administrative court) under
the pretext that Egyptian society was not ready for women on the bench. 8 Instead of
becoming Egypt’s first female judge, she became the country’s first woman law
professor in 1970, first female ambassador in 1979, and first woman head of a Law
Department (Mehanna and Sonneveld 2021). Rateb was interested in gender equality
in a remarkable way. She thought it unfair that where men were subjected to
compulsory conscription, women were exempt from making themselves available for
public service. Hence, she made it compulsory for female university graduates to work
for one year with nominal salary in a public service project (ibid.). She also strove to
reform the laws on Muslim personal status and in the early 1970s became the head of
the Committee for the Revision of Family Law.
One of the more controversial measures Rateb wanted to introduce was making a
husband’s unilateral right to divorce (talaq) conditional on appearance and
registration in court. The then Shaykh of al-Azhar, ‘Abd al-Halim Mahmud, is claimed
to have said that if the divorce provision were passed, he would resign from his
position. Sadat gave in and the provision was excluded from the draft law.9 The draft
law was blocked in 1975 (Esposito 1982: 62), at a time when an Egyptian delegation
went to the first 1975 United Nations conference on women, held in Mexico. Feeling
humiliated and with another UN conference on women on the horizon (Copenhagen,
1980), Sadat sped up the reform process. By May 1979, no consensus had been
achieved and, not wanting the draft law to be blocked again by the opposition groups,
Sadat looked for an alternative way of effecting legislation. Shortly after the death of
the conservative Shaykh of al-Azhar, ‘Abd al-Halim Mahmud (Zeghal 1999: 387), and
in the absence of the People’s Assembly, Sadat used his constitutional right to issue an
emergency decree, in which he passed the draft into law (Sonneveld 2012: 26). The
8 It would take until 2003 for the first female Egyptian judge to be appointed (to the High
Constitutional Court). In the years that followed a small number of female judges was appointed to
Courts of First Instance, but out of a total number of more than 12,000 judges only 120 are women.
9 Interview with Ahmed Tawfik, Leiden, the Netherlands, 24 October 2017.

15

new law (Law No. 44/1979) provoked much controversy as Muslim women’s grounds
for divorce were expanded: in case of polygamy, they could petition the court for
divorce on the grounds of harm, after which the divorce would be granted
automatically. Another controversial provision concerned the right of divorced women
with children to remain living in the marital home. In 1985, the High Constitutional
Court declared the law unconstitutional because it had been promulgated without
parliamentary approval and while no state of emergency had existed. Later that year,
an adapted version of the 1979 PSL was implemented (Law No. 100/1985). While
polygamy was still included as grounds for divorce, women needed to prove that the
other marriage had caused them harm.
Despite the setbacks in the 1970s and 1980s, the women’s rights movement in Egypt
continued its efforts to make divorce for Muslim women easier. In the late 1990s, a
group of seven activists, the Group of Seven, was successful in securing the support of
the Minister of Justice and the Shaykh of al-Azhar for a divorce reform, and in 2000
the People’s Assembly ‘accepted’ a new procedural law on personal status, which also
included a few substantive provisions. The provision concerning a new understanding
of khulʿ as a no-fault, non-consensual divorce provoked much controversy as it was
thought that giving women the right to divorce without the consent of the husband and
without the need to show cause in court went against Islamic religious principles and
would destabilise the Egyptian Muslim family (Sonneveld 2012, chapters 2 and 3).
Other reforms followed in what has become known as the decade of Muslim women’s
rights reform: women were given the right to include stipulations in their marriage
contracts (August 2000); travel (abroad) without the consent of the husband
(November 2000); Egyptian women married to non-Egyptian men were allowed to
pass their Egyptian nationality to their children (2004);10 the custody age was raised
from twelve for girls and ten for boys to fifteen for both, with the possibility of
extending it until marriage for girls and for boys until they had reached “maturity of
mind” (2005); and in case of divorce the parent with custody over the child(ren) was
given educational guardianship (2008).11 From a human rights perspective it is fair to
say that in the first decade of the new millennium Muslim women’s rights had
improved considerably, both on paper and in judicial practice. 12 And sometimes this
was favourable to Coptic women too as they had the right to request no-fault, nonconsensual khul‘ should Muslim family law be applicable to their cases (Bernard-

10 There was one exception: Egyptian women married to Palestinian men.
11 For a more detailed overview of the reforms, see Sonneveld and Lindbekk (2015).
12 For detailed analyses of the implementation of khul‘ in the courts and everyday life, see Sonneveld
(2012); Lindbekk (2013); and al-Sharmani (2017).
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Maugiron 2011: 378). In general, however, the situation had taken a bad turn for
Coptic men and women who wanted to end their marriages.
Despite Shenouda’s Papal decree of 1971 in which the grounds for divorce were
reduced to adultery only, the national courts continued applying the 1938 law. In turn,
the Coptic Church refused to recognise these divorce rulings and did not give couples
permission to remarry (Shaham 2010; Bernard-Maugiron 2011; Lindbekk 2014). To
end this unfavourable situation, the Coptic Community Council amended the 1938 law
in 2008, reducing the grounds for divorce from nine to two: adultery, including
presumptions of adultery, and apostasy (Bernard-Maugiron 2011). Its application in
the national courts, however, was not uniform as Lindbekk (2014) shows in her
analysis based on court rulings and interviews with judges and lawyers in the early
2010s. Although most judges, most of them Muslim, were careful in granting Coptic
litigants a divorce on the basis of adultery, others, the judges of the Cairo Appeal Court
in particular, were more lenient and used different sources to allow Copts to divorce
on the basis of adultery. Some engaged in interpretation of the Bible, while others
interpreted Coptic divorce law in line with Muslim PSL or social norms, which
discriminate against women (Lindbekk 2014). Again, this infuriated Pope Shenouda
and he refused to remarry Copts who had divorced on grounds other than adultery.

Conclusion and epilogue
In this paper, I have focused on a comparison of the divorce rights of religious
minorities. In the context of a century of PSL reform in Egypt (1920–2020), I asked
how Coptic Orthodox PSL has developed in comparison to Muslim PSL and how
differences and similarities can be explained.
Where Muslim women’s divorce rights steadily improved, culminating in no-fault
non-consensual divorce through khulʿ in 2000, Coptic men and women witnessed a
deterioration in the right to divorce and, relatedly, to remarry. It would be tempting to
explain the differences on the basis of two factors, i.e. the religious minority status of
Copts and the strong position of the Coptic Pope as leader of the Coptic Orthodox
Church. In the Muslim-majority country of Egypt, different popes have attempted to
foster a strong religious identity, especially after the early 1970s when a period of
Islamic revivalism in Egypt set in. Among the most pronounced markers of Coptic
Orthodox identity is the sacrament of marriage, and its preservation by severely
limiting the grounds of divorce from nine in 1938 to two in 2008 has been a major goal
of popes from the mid 1940s onwards, culminating in 1971. At the same time that then
president Sadat introduced a constitutional provision stating that the principles of
Islamic shari‘a were a main source of legislation, late Pope Shenouda III issued a Papal
Decree in which the grounds for divorce were reduced from nine to two. Thus, where
17

both Muslim men and women have access to no-fault, non-consensual divorce, Copts,
irrespective of their gender, can only end the marital relationship on the basis of
adultery or apostasy. However, inter-communal tensions alone cannot sufficiently
explain the differences in family law reform trajectories (see also Scott 2020).
Throughout the century, state interference in the legislative and judicial autonomy of
religious communities in matters of family law has played a decisive role, in fostering
both inter-communal as well as intra-communal tension.
Starting at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, both Coptic and Muslim
religious authorities gradually lost legislative autonomy in the field of family law. The
first codified Muslim PSL in 1920 was drafted by a committee composed of both
religious scholars, such as the Shaykh of al-Azhar, and non-religious actors, such as
secular-trained judges. The 1938 Coptic law on personal status was even drafted by a
body composed of lay Copts only, the Coptic Community Council, much to the chagrin
of the Coptic clergy. In both cases, the interference of the state in family law matters
was aimed at transferring the power of Muslim and Coptic religious authorities to lay
communal leadership. This culminated in 1955 when, under Nasser, the religious
courts were abolished, and religious communities lost their judicial autonomy too.
Muslim and Coptic religious leaders maintained varying levels of influence but had to
contend with actors with non-religious training who increasingly claimed a role in
setting the parameters for divorce reform, and, given that family law in Egypt is
religion-based, reform of religious law in general. The heated public debate concerning
the introduction of no-fault, non-consensual khulʿ divorce for Muslim women makes
this noticeably clear. Now one could counter that the power of the Coptic pope and
Coptic clergy has increased at the expense of lay actors, such as the Coptic Community
Council. After all, the Coptic Community Council was responsible for amending the
1938 law in 2008, reducing the grounds for divorce from nine to two, after the
continuous refusal of late Pope Shenouda III to remarry Copts who had divorced on
grounds other than adultery or apostasy. In an article on divorce and remarriage of
Orthodox Copts in Egypt following the 2008 amendment, Bernard-Maugiron even
states that “Even if the Coptic community is not unanimous in its support for the
Pope’s position on divorce, the radicalization of religion makes it difficult for liberal
Copts to express their opposition to the Pope’s stance and to make their voices heard”
(2011: 385). This was to change soon (Lindbekk 2014; Sonneveld and Lindbekk 2015;
Elsässer 2019; Scott 2020).
In the post-revolutionary period (2011–13) a noticeable development in the field of
family law debate took place: the organised public opposition of individuals directly
affected by extant Muslim and Coptic family law provisions. Demanding a bigger role
for divorced fathers in the upbringing of their children, divorced Muslim men
lamented Muslim women’s increased opportunities to divorce for what they claimed
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were frivolous reasons. Saying that the reforms went against Islamic shari‘a, they
arranged demonstrations in front of al-Azhar (Sonneveld and Lindbekk, 2015). Coptic
men and women publicly rallied to demonstrations condemning the strict Coptic
divorce laws. According to journalist Ibrahim “The Egyptian revolution has energised
Egypt's Copts in more ways than one, standing up for their rights not just vis-a-vis the
state, but also their own Church hierarchy” (2011). A small group of lay Copts, who
named themselves ‘Copts 38,’ after the liberal 1938 Coptic family law, even argued that
Copts who are excluded from the constitutional right to be ruled by the principles of
Islamic shari‘a are becoming second-class citizens (Lindbekk 2014). After the death of
Pope Shenouda in 2012, the debates within the Coptic community on marriage and
divorce led the new pope, Tawadros II, to implement a number of reforms, such as the
establishment of regional councils to facilitate procedures for resolving family
problems and more liberal provisions concerning divorce, notably the introduction of
separation as a ground for divorce (Elsässer 2019). It is not clear yet whether this also
led the Church to take a more lenient approach to remarriage, and whether the new
measures are sufficient to stop Copts in unhappy marriages from converting to Islam
(ibid.).
Can we use the observations above to understand better the situation of Muslim
minorities in the West with regard to divorce? Several studies have pointed out that
the lack of clear Islamic authority in the West makes it difficult for Muslim women
(who have obtained a civil divorce) to obtain a religious divorce (e.g., MacFarlane
2012; Jaraba 2019; Van Eijk 2019). We have seen that lack of Islamic authority is a
feature pertaining to both Muslims living in the West and Muslims living in Muslimmajority countries. Moreover, even in the Coptic Church the authority of the pope is
contested, both from within (Coptic Community Council; Copts sue Church in national
courts; Copts 38; general protests, people converting to Islam) and from outside
(establishment of Coptic Community Council; abolition of religious courts; Muslim
judges did not recognise the Papal Decree on divorce). Being religion-based, family
law is a clear marker of religious identity, and, hence, its reform is hotly debated, both
in countries where Muslims and Christians form a minority and a majority. There is
one difference; where in Egypt, the Coptic clergy and Coptic Community Council, each
in their own ways, have tried to prevent conversion to Islam in order to obtain “an easy
divorce,” in the West obtaining an easy divorce does not require a Muslim woman to
convert to another religion.
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2. Custody and the Best Interests of the Child in
Egyptian Courts
Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron
Recent legislative reforms in Egyptian family law have given paramount importance
to the protection of the ‘best interests of the child’ in custody cases. The 2008
amendments to the 1996 Child Law set this course, later entrenched in the 2014
Constitution, when the best interests of the child made their first appearance in a
constitutional provision. However, no definition of what constitutes the ‘best interests
of the child’ is provided in these texts. The law, on the other hand, assigns significant
powers to judges to allow them to ascertain such an interest on a case-by-case basis by
prioritising different conflicting interests.
Through the analysis of a court decision dealing with a custody case, this contribution
tries to identify the elements that Egyptian judges consider when looking for the ‘best
interests of the child.’ In doing so, it investigates whether new trends have appeared
in this field in the face of the heated debates that have been dividing Egyptian society
for several years regarding custody and visiting rights of divorced fathers.

1. The Shubra Family Court case of 30 April 2011
On 30 April 2011, after Egypt overthrew its president and was going through a phase
of great instability under the leadership of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces,
the Family Court of Shubra1 accepted the request of Taymur2 to have his two young
daughters, Manal and Lubna, stay at his home once a month. 3 This decision was
unexpected since divorced fathers were struggling to reform the family laws which
were depriving them of custody and hosting rights of their children.
If the Egyptian personal status laws of 1920 and 1929 have often been criticised for
establishing an imbalance in rights and duties within the couple in favour of the
husband, custody is one of the areas, along with payment of dower and alimony, where

 CEPED / IRD / Paris University
1 Popular district of Central/North Cairo.
2 To protect the anonymity of the family all names have been changed.
3 Shubra Family Court, Wilāya ‘ala-l-nafs, case No 841/2010, April 30, 2011.
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the wife has been given more power than the husband. This has continued to increase
up to the present day after the laws were amended several times.

2. The facts behind the Shubra Family Court case of 30 April
2011
On 12 December 2010, Taymur filed a motion in the Family Court of Shubra asking for
the right to see (aḥaqqiya fī-ruʾya) his two daughters, Manal and Lubna, once a week
as well as the right to have them stay at his home (istiḍāfa) once a month.
According to the summary of the facts included in the decision, the couple had married
in 1996, the marriage had been consummated (maʿa al-dukhūl wa-l-muʿāshara) and
two daughters were born to the couple, Manal in 1997 and Lubna in 1999. Both were
in the custody of their mother but the father complained that his wife had deprived
him without any reason of the right to see them (manaʿathu min ruʾyatihimā dūn
waǧh ḥaqq) even though she was still under his authority (mā zālat fi ʿiṣmatihi) and
owed him obedience (taḥt tāʿatihi). After failed attempts by the court’s conciliation
office to reach an amicable settlement (taswiyya waddiyya), he resolved to take legal
action. The two parties, each represented by their lawyer (a female lawyer for the
husband), and the representative of the public prosecutor's office had attended the
hearing that took place on 27 March 2011.
The court, comprised of three judges, had proposed conciliation (ṣulḥ) to the parties
but they refused, and the case was postponed for a month, until 24 April 2011. As it
turned out, it was a holiday (Coptic Easter), so the decision was delivered on 30 April
2011.

3. The decision of the Shubra Family Court
The Court decided to allow the father to host his daughters on the first weekend of
each month and to see them during the other weekends.

3.1. Regarding accommodation
In order to accept the father’s request regarding accommodation, the Court referred
to several legal grounds, including international law.

3.2.1. International human rights law
The Court first referred to the provisional Constitutional Declaration adopted by the
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces on 30 March 2011 to replace the 1971
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Constitution that had been abrogated on 13 February 2011 after the fall of Hosni
Mubarak. According to Article 56 of this Declaration, the Supreme Council of the
Armed Forces was to undertake the administration of the affairs of the country,
including the representation of the state at international level and the conclusion of
international treaties and agreements. Article 62 of the same Declaration added that
all laws and regulations decided before the promulgation of the Constitutional
Declaration were to remain in force as long as they had not been modified. The court
considered that international conventions ratified by Egypt were therefore to remain
in force too.
The court then invoked several international conventions ratified by Egypt. It referred
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and in particular to Article 3, according
to which in all actions concerning children, the best interests of the child shall be a
primary consideration; to Article 9, by which states undertake to respect the right of
the child who is separated from one or both parents to maintain personal relations and
direct contact with both parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the child’s
best interests; and to Article 18, by which states shall use their best efforts to ensure
recognition of the principle that both parents have common responsibilities for the
upbringing and development of the child.
The judge also invoked the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (Art.
19) ratified by Egypt in 1999, according to which every child shall be entitled to the
enjoyment of parental care and protection and shall, whenever possible, have the right
to reside with his or her parents. The Charter also affirms that no child shall be
separated from his/her parents against his/her will, except when a judicial authority
determines in accordance with the appropriate law, that such separation is in the best
interest of the child.

3.1.2. Egyptian legal and religious norms
The court then pointed out that the two young girls were under the age of 15 and were
therefore in the care of their mother. It added, however, that it was recognised (min
al-muqarrar) by sharīʿa, by fiqh and law (qānūnan) that it was prohibited to deprive
a child of the right to receive care (riʿāya) from their father, especially since he is the
one who covers their expenses for food, clothing, housing, medical care and education.
The Court concluded that it saw no legal impediment (māniʿ qānūnī) in allowing the
father to house his children, especially since the mother had presented no means of
defence. The judges therefore authorised the father to receive his daughters at his
home on the first Thursday of each month, for 24 hours, from Thursday evening at
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seven p.m. until Friday evening at seven p.m., provided that he undertook to deliver
them back to their mother.

3.2. Right of visitation
With regard to the right of visitation, the court recalled that according to Article 20 of
law No. 25 of 1929, as amended in 1985 by law No. 100 and by law No. 4 of 2005, each
parent has the right to see his/her child but that this right cannot be enforced by force
(qahran). However, if it is not respected without excuse (bi-ghayr ʿudhr), the custodial
parent may have custody of his/her child temporarily withdrawn for the benefit of the
following beneficiary in the list.
The court also recalled that in accordance with Article 5 of ministerial decree No. 1087
of 2000, the duration of the right of access of the non-custodial parent cannot be less
than three hours per week and must take place between nine a.m. and seven p.m.,
preferably on a day off so as not to disrupt the child's schooling.
The court stressed that the fact that the father had brought the case to the court proved
the failure of the parents to organise access rights by mutual agreement, which was
also shown by the fact that the mother did not present any plea of defence.
Based on the report of the sociologist and psychologist who examined the case before
it was submitted to the court, the judges decided that the most suitable time for the
father to access his daughters was on Fridays from one p.m. to four p.m. and that these
visits would take place at the Sharābiyya Youth Center (markaz shabāb), except in the
weeks when the father would host his daughters.

4. Analysis of the Court decision

4.1. Custody in Egyptian law
The question of the visitation rights of the non-custodial parent has been the subject
of heated debate in Egyptian society for several years.

4.1.1. Allocation of custody to the mother
Custody (ḥaḍāna) of the child in case of the separation of their parents is regulated by
Law No. 25 of 1929 as amended in 1985 and 2005. The 1929 law (Art. 20) made a
distinction according to the sex of the child: it set the custody age at seven for boys and
nine for girls, after which the child should be taken from their mother and entrusted
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to their father. However, the judge had the power to extend the custody rights of the
mother up to nine years for boys and to eleven years for girls, when the interests of the
child so required (idhā tabayyana anna maṣlaḥatahum taqtaḍī dhālik).4 The law
therefore followed the traditional solution in Hanafi law where the mother is entrusted
with the rearing of young children before handing them over to their father, and where
the duration of maternal care of daughters is longer than that of sons.5 In 1985, the
law was amended (Art. 18bis2) to extend the custody rights of the mother until the age
of twelve for girls and ten for boys, with the possibility for a judge to extend this to
fifteen years for boys and up to their marriage for girls, if it appeared that their interest
so required. In 2005, the law was amended again (Art. 1 of Law No. 4) to raise maternal
custody of both daughters and sons until the age of fifteen. After that age, the judge
will ask them to choose between their mother and father but will not be bound by their
opinion.
During the entire period of custody, the father must pay an alimony to the mother (aǧr
al-ḥaḍāna) to compensate for the care provided to the children. He must also pay a
pension for the maintenance of his children (nafaqat al-awlād). However, in the event
of an extension of custody by the judge, only the child’s pension continues to be paid.
If the mother, as a custodian, is entrusted with the day-to-day care of the children, the
father is assigned guardianship (wilāya) over the person and the property of the child.
He is responsible for managing the child’s property until he/she comes of age and for
making the most important decisions regarding him/her. Egyptian law is therefore
based on the traditional distribution of responsibilities between the father who
exercises guardianship over the person and the property of the child while the mother
is entrusted with custody in their younger years. Furthermore, the Egyptian legislator
takes it for granted that every mother is affectionate, close to her child, understanding
and protective, while a father cannot have the same qualities.
If the mother can no longer provide custody, the law of 1929 (Art. 20 para. 5) as
amended in 1985, specifies the order in which custody must be distributed among the
relatives of the child: the mother of the mother is the first in line to exercise custody
after the mother, then the mother of the father, then all female relatives of the mother
and the father, then the father and all male relatives on both sides.

4 The Courts often agreed to extend a divorced mother’s custody for two years when the father had
remarried. See Kholoussy 2010: 120–121.
5 This traditional Hanafi solution had also been codified in the Qadri Pasha Code of 1875 (Art. 391).
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The main case in which the divorced mother is deprived of custody is when she
remarries with a ‘stranger’ to the child from the point of view of the child’s kinship.
Although no law currently in force in Egypt provides for the forfeiture of the mother’s
right to custody in the event of remarriage to a man who is not a relative of the child
within the prohibited degrees, court records show that forfeiture is often pronounced
by judges in application of the prevailing opinion within the Hanafi school. This is in
accordance with Article 3 of the preliminary provisions to the promulgation of law No.
1 of 2000 that provides that if the law is silent on a certain matter, the judge shall apply
the prevailing opinion in the Hanafi school.

4.1.2. The father's visiting and accommodation rights
Article 20 of the 1929 law, as amended in 1985, grants both parents and, in their
absence or in the event of death, grandparents, a right to “see” (ḥaqq al-ruʾya) their
minor children or grandchildren. If the meeting cannot take place on the basis of an
agreement with the custodian, the judge must arrange the visit. According to Law No.
1 of 2000 on procedure in personal status cases (art. 67) an executive order of the
Minister of Justice was to determine the conditions under which the visitation right
takes place. The Executive Order No. 1087 of 2000 decided that the non-custodial
parent is entitled to see his/her child for a minimum period of three hours per week
between nine a.m. and seven p.m., preferably on a day off so as not to disturb the
child's school life (art. 5). The meeting can take place in a sports or social club, a youth
protection centre or a child protection house provided there is a garden, or in a public
park (art. 4). There is no provision in the law regarding housing of the children by the
non-custodian parent or even receiving them in their house during daytime. Legally,
therefore, the father cannot claim the right to have his children visit him at his home
without the mother's agreement.
Several bills have been drafted, both before and after 2011, to reform visiting rights
and enhance divorced fathers' rights of access to their children. After the uprising of
2011, divorced fathers took advantage of the wave of freedom brought about by the fall
of Mubarak and formed associations to expand their rights for joint care after divorce,
blaming the current visitation conditions for operating in a climate of hostility and lack
of privacy, not conducive to the establishment of an emotional bond with their
children.6 To pressure public opinion and institutions, protest groups went so far as to
organise sit-ins in front of al-Azhar University, the Ministry of Justice and the newly
elected parliament. They called for the resignation of the mufti and sheikh of al-Azhar,
blaming them for having approved the laws currently in force, which were contrary to
the sharīʿa. It may be paradoxical that they were calling for the respect of Hanafi law
6 For a study of the arguments raised by these associations, see Sonneveld and Lindbekk 2015.
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with regard to the age of custody that they wanted to be seven for boys and nine for
girls, while against the implementation of the same Hanafi law with regard to the list
of relatives that may have custody of the child after the mother and which excludes
fathers.
On the opposite side, groups of divorced mothers replied that, most often, fathers do
not pay alimony for their children, do not use their visiting rights, and that giving them
a right to have the child stay in their home would risk multiplying the cases of
abduction of children, with fathers refusing to return them to their carers. They added
that existing laws were not based on concepts imported from the West but were in
accordance with the principles of sharīʿa and that the reforms invoked by the groups
of fathers would have a negative impact on the well-being of their children.7 The
People's Assembly was dissolved in June 2012 without the draft laws having been
adopted or even discussed in plenary.8
The debate arose again at the end of 2016. A reform bill proposed that fathers could
have their children stay with them at their home two days a week as well as for one
month during the summer holidays9. It was taken up by the opposition party al-Wafd,
but the bill was rejected by parliament for violating the rights of women, without any
reflection on the best interests of the child. The different parties involved each
defended the interests of the father or the mother, but the best interest of the child was
never at the heart of the discussions.

4.2. The reasons behind the Shubra Family Court decision
The decision of Shubra Family Court may have been taken in the euphoria of the fall
of Mubarak and the high expectations of Egyptian society regarding the establishment
of democracy and respect for human rights and international standards. Other reasons
may be more specific to the case. Indeed, the parents were not divorced but only
separated. As mentioned at the beginning of the decision, the mother was still in her
husband’s ʿiṣma and had to obey him even if they were not living together anymore.
Legally, the husband could have filed a case requiring her to remain obedient to him
and come back and stay with him with his daughters, on penalty of losing her

7 Sonneveld and Lindbekk 2015
8 In November 2014, al-Azhar University published a fatwa stating that the custody age as stated in
the law should not be changed and that the father should not have his children to stay in his house
without the mother’s agreement.
9 Sayed Ahmed 2016.
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maintenance (nafaqa) rights. It may be that this was the reason why the mother did
not try to present any plea of defence.
Another reason, also specific to the case, may be the fact that the two parents lived
separated but in the same district, street and even in the same complex of buildings in
the popular district of al-Sharābiyya. It is therefore to be expected that both the mother
and the judge were confident that the mother would be able to keep an eye on her
children and that the risk of abduction was less high.
This case, however, is not isolated. Mansoura Court of Appeal, for instance, quashed a
family court judgment which had denied a divorced father the right to host his son
during holidays and vacations.10 The Court held that since there was no provision in
Egyptian law regulating accommodation of a child by their father, the judge had to
apply the prevailing opinion within the Hanafi school, in accordance with Article 3 of
the promulgating law of law No. 1 of 2000. In childhood, clarified the Court, the child
needs their mother, while later they need to train themselves intellectually (tathqīfa)
and learn discipline (taʾdībiyya). The Court added that according to the Hanafi school,
this second stage begins when the child reaches the age of seven. The judge added that
even though custody is often considered a right of the father or the mother, it must be
considered as a right of the child. Their interest must prevail and has to be taken into
consideration by the judge.
In this case, the Court of Appeal held that since the child was over seven and was able
to dress and feed themselves, there was nothing preventing their father from hosting
them two days a week as well as during holidays and vacations. Accommodation was
in the best interest of the child because it allowed them to get closer to their father and
to know him better, to strengthen their bonds, to make them more obedient and to
forge a more virile character while maintaining contact with their relatives. The judge
added that the mother would suffer no prejudice as a result of this short-term
temporary accommodation.

5. The best interests of the child
In 2008, the Egyptian 1996 Child Law was amended to require that the best interests
of the child (maṣlaḥat al-tifl al-fuḍlá) prevail “in all decisions and measures relating
to children regardless of the party which is at their origin or which applies them” (Art.
3). The 2014 Constitution also mentioned the best interest of the child for the first

10 Mansoura Court of Appeal, Case No 280/60, 10 February 2009.
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time: “The State shall endeavour to achieve the best interest of children in all measures
affecting them” (Art. 80 para. 6).
Egyptian courts attach paramount importance to the protection of the best interest of
the child in custody cases. However, this concept is a very difficult one to define.
Neither the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, nor Egyptian law,
provide a definition. Both refer to the interpretation which is given by the authorities
responsible for implementing their provisions and in particular to judges.
Egyptian case law on custody rests on a very precise conception of what constitutes the
best interest of a male child: he is to be raised by his caring mother during his youngest
years, followed by his father who will train him intellectually and instil discipline and
manhood in him. Tearing him away from his mother during this period when he is not
independent would therefore be prejudicial to him. For Egyptian courts, it goes
without saying that the mother should have the main responsibility in caring for a male
child in his first years. It was only after finding that the child in question was
autonomous that Mansoura Court of Appeal considered that he could stay with his
father from time to time, implying that the father would not have been able to take
care of his young child alone.
Furthermore, although the judge did not challenge this provision, a visitation right of
three hours a week violates the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the other
human rights instruments he mentioned, which stress the importance for a child of
seeing both parents.
The law assigns significant powers to judges in determining the best interests of the
child, and invites them to determine such an interest on a case-by-case basis by
prioritising different conflicting interests. In practice, however, judges rarely look for
the child's interest in the factual circumstances of the case submitted to them, and
systematically assume that it is in their best interest is to stay with their mother during
their youngest years, followed by their father in their later years.
Moreover, legislative reforms have extended the duration of maternal custody,
unifying rules between girls and boys, and allowing a child of over 15 years of age to
express their preference. At the same time, paternal rights to custody have been
increasingly limited. In addition, since the amendment of the Child Law in 2008 (Art.
54 of Law No. 126) the right to assume educational guardianship (wilāya taʿlīmiyya)
over her children and to supervise their education has been transferred to a mother
who has custody: previously this was the responsibility of the guardian father.
Although an increasingly powerful movement had been advocating for the right of
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fathers to exercise joint care of their children, the law has not been amended yet.
However, some judges, like those at Mansoura and Shubra courts, did not wait for the
legislator to amend the very controversial rules. Instead they decided to look for what
they considered to be the best interests of the child on a case-by-case basis, relying on
the different legal sources available, the constitution, international conventions and
fiqh.
*****
A bill amending the personal status law was introduced in parliament in February 2021
by the Egyptian cabinet.11 Among the measures included is the proposal to modify the
list of those of a child’s relatives of entitled to custody: the father would now come
fourth, after the mother and the two grandmothers. Furthermore, he would be granted
the right of accommodation of his child but would face a prison sentence up to six
months and the loss of his right of accommodation if he did not return the child to
their custodian. If voted into law, the bill would also require the father's permission
for the mother to travel abroad with her children. The bill also includes a provision
intended to diminish the mother’s financial and administrative rights over the child
(wilāya).
The proposal sparked widespread controversy and backlash, especially from feminist
and human rights organisations who complained about their complete exclusion from
the drafting process of the amendment. An online campaign also criticised the bill
under the hashtag “guardianship is my right” (#al-wilāya_ḥaqqī, in Arabic).12 In the
best interest of the child?

11 Hamed Mohammed Hamed, Mohammed Ali 2021.
12 Mada Masr, 18 March 2021.
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3. The Impact and Effect of Drama on the Laws of
Society
Enas Lotfy
Why should any drama writer hold on to an idea and keep taming it for a long time
until it yields and flows on paper, drawing real characters, scenario, dialogue and plot,
to finally produce a tight flesh-and-blood story? Is it a passion? Is it the lust for
narration that we are born with? The ideas that interest their mind and which they
want to share with others? Or the change that they dream of? The change of the bitter
reality in which we live in our Arab Islamic society, which suffers from ignorance,
absence, obsolete customs, and traditions.
I think it is all of the above-mentioned reasons that push a writer to write their story,
whether as a novel, short stories, a play for the theatre or cinema, because story telling
is the origin no matter the way you tell it. That is why I always introduce myself as a
‘storyteller’ because I believe that telling stories strongly affects the thoughts of
humans. It changes the compass of their mind and invites them to listen to different
ideas, even if they reject and resist those ideas. Cinema is one of the most important
means of revealing what is hidden and of fighting against ignorance and the blindness
of minds, while at the same time entertaining and amusing people.

1. My Bashtarī Rāğil (2017) and motherhood without a
husband
My essential purpose while writing my film *Bashtarī Rāǧil [Buying a Man] (produced
in 2017, directed by Mohamed Ali and starring Nilly Karem and Mohamed Mamdoh),
was to talk about something that had never before been discussed in our society,
something that girls speak of secretly between themselves away from the judgement
of society; the desire for motherhood by those who suffer from loneliness, have lost
faith in love and men, and for whom having a baby will compensate for all the love that
is missing in their life. Of course, due to the provision of law and religion girls cannot
fulfil these desires outside the bounds of legal marriage, so they must manipulate
society by having a fake marriage and giving birth through artificial insemination.
A shocking notion that had to be presented in a sarcastic comedy at a specific time in
our society, which is ruled by strictly conservative ideas and rejects bold ideas. The
 Egyptian screenwriter
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aim of the film is to shake up the rules of the family that govern the Arab mind, whether
they be the rules of society or the rules of the situation because, of course, there cannot
be a statutory law that allows a girl to have a baby without marriage. The heroine of
the film therefore challenges the rules of society, causing the spectator to wonder and
ask questions about societal norms. This is what is referred to as the impact of drama
on society.
The reception in society of the idea behind this film was attentive listening to the issue.
To decrease tension and anxiety among those with conservative ideas – which has
unfortunately become one of the most prevalent groups in our society – the film was
presented in comic form and its end conformed to the agreed societal norms, which is
the ‘natural’ marriage (al-zawāǧ al-ṭabīʿī). I was keen to convey the ideas in the film
in this way, in order to provide more space for acceptance of the idea behind it and to
make people think about it without having an ideological or societal reaction. I am
aware of the sensitive stage that our society is going through, in terms of reticence in
proposing bold ideas, so the film caused quite a shock, followed by dialogue and
reflection. Of course there was rejection, but in a sober way, and this became clear
through my being invited on to several television and radio programmes, the interest
of the press in the boldness of the film, and the discussions with me about the reasons
for my presentation of this sensitive idea.
As for the reception by the audience, which is most important to me, it was more than
wonderful, especially that of girls. I received many messages and praise for the idea.
The most beautiful sentence I heard was when a girl told me that she was the hero of
this film in her personal life. The desire for motherhood and the fear of association
and marriage with a man are true feelings and ideas that exist in our society. There is
a crisis of mutual trust between men and women. In fact, there is a crisis of confidence
in the idea of love itself. In the West, this matter was resolved by giving any girl the
opportunity to become pregnant and give birth without marriage and without the
presence of a man in her life, but in our society the declaration of this same desire is a
form of madness. However, it was not one of my goals to change the law with this film.
Of course, this was impossible given a religion — as well as a law — that rejects this.
However, to announce these ideas and to embody our feelings and needs through the
film is the greatest victory, and this was enough for me. It has pushed me to think
seriously about writing a work requiring the changing of laws that I see as unjust in
terms of the rights of women and the family. Expressing our ideas is no longer enough
and we must now move to another stage that has more influence in society, which is
the demand to change laws that no longer suit us temporally, socially or intellectually.
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2. Egyptian cinema and family law
Therefore, I would like to shed light on the history of Egyptian cinema and highlight
some of its contributions in terms of films that embodied the injustice and
disadvantage of some family laws that negatively affected society in general, and how
these dramas dealt with this problem. For many years, drama has had a history of
stimulating change as well as raising discussions that affect family rules while
expressing underlying problems and social phenomena that were never spoken of
openly. Drama also rejects ideas and incorrect social judgments that are widespread
among people concerning divorce cases, early marriage, circumcision, khulʿ and
inheritance.
To provide some examples of the impact that drama has had by changing certain social
rules, discussing issues regarding the implementation of social law, as opposed to
statutory law, or even manipulating the law to implement obsolete social laws, I
recommend a quick review of the history of Egyptian cinema and drama, which has
always taken the lead when speaking of justice, human rights and the implementation
of law in Egyptian society. I will present the most important family laws that were
discussed in particular Egyptian films.

2.1. Divorce initiated by the husband.
Urīdu Ḥallan [I Want a Solution], which was shown in March 1975, is the most
important Egyptian film that directly achieved its goal of changing divorce law in
Egypt. It is based on the story by journalist Hassan Shah, with scenario and dialogue
by Saad El-Deen Wahbah, directed by Saeed Marzouk, and starring Faten Hamamah,
Roushdy Abazah and Aminah Rizk. The film ranks number 21 on the list of the 100
best Egyptian films and was previously nominated for an Oscar as the best foreign film
in 1975. The film revealed the disadvantages of personal status law in Egypt and helped
to change it. It succeeded in showing the cruelty of society towards women who file for
divorce as well as the challenges they face in court and how they are viewed by society.
The film follows a woman who is unable to carry on living with her husband. As such,
she files for divorce, but he refuses. She therefore files a lawsuit which propels her
through a maze of courts and causes trouble between herself and her husband when
he brings false witnesses against her in court. She not only loses her dignity, but the
situation becomes even more complicated when she loses the case after more than four
years in trial and the judge refuses to grant her divorce. This depiction made the film
highly controversial and caused Jihan El Sadat, wife of Anwar El Sadat – the then
serving president of Egypt – to focus on passing the personal status law. The 44 law
was passed in 1979, and due to the intervention of the First Lady, it was called ‘Jihan
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Law’. However, it was unfortunately soon cancelled by the Supreme Constitutional
Court in May 1985.
It is worth noting that Urīdu Ḥallan is the third film in the history of Egyptian cinema
to cause a change in the law. The first film to do this before Urīdu Ḥallan was Ǧaʿālūnī
Muǧriman [They Made Me a Criminal]. It was produced in 1953, directed by Atef
Salem, and starred Fareed Shawky and Huda Sultan. The script was based on the work
of internationally recognised author Naguib Mahfouz, the scenario by Ramsis Naguib,
and the dialogue by Elsayed Bedir. As Egyptian criminal law was reconsidered, a new
law was enacted to cancel the registration of the first criminal precedent in the judicial
record, to give any repentant criminal the opportunity to return to his normal life and
obtain employment without difficulties or societal harassment.
The second film, Kalimat Sharaf [A Word of Honour], produced in 1973 and directed
by Hossam El Din Mostafa, starred Farid Shawqi, Ahmed Mazhar and Hind Rustom
in a script and scenario by Farouk Sabry, with dialogue by Farouk Sabry and Farid
Shawky. It precipitated the adoption of a new law that granted a prisoner the (human)
right to visit their family under specific controls in specifical circumstances,
particularly when their close family members were unable to visit them in prison.
The dramatic influence of Urīdu Ḥallan also inspired the plot of another film, Āsifa,
Arfuḍ al-Ṭalāq [Sorry, I Refuse the Divorce], which, however, reversed the original
premise. It was released in 1980 as a TV film through a television station that belongs
to the Egyptian government. Involving the scenario and dialogue of Nadia Rashad, it
was directed by Inaam Mohamed Ali and starred Mervat Amin and Hussein Fahmy.
The film tells of a married couple who lead an ideal life, until the husband's old love
appears. He decides to abandon his current life with his wife and to divorce her. With
the help of her family and friends, the wife challenges the divorce and files a suit
against her husband demanding that he does not divorce her. She presents that he
does not have the sole right to decide the fate of their relationship. The movie ends
with the man returning to his wife. However, she refuses to return to him because her
goal was to show him that the decision to divorce was not his alone to make.
This film is considered among the most significant films in which the drama has
succeeded in sending an important message to society. in this case the message is that
a woman has the right to reject or continue a marital relationship and that the decision
is not in the hands of the husband alone, to marry or divorce at any time he wants. At
the time of the film’s presentation, some women's organisations demanded that
divorce be granted by a judge’s ruling simply by asking the woman for her consent or
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refusal to divorce, regardless of whether or not the husband wanted this, so that the
two were equal before the law.
Addressing the issue of verbal divorce, which is unfortunately prevalent in our society
and which circumvents the law, is the comic film *Zōǧ Taḥt iṭ-Ṭalab [Husband on
Demand]. The film mocks the irresponsibility of a man who files for divorce for petty
reasons, until he runs out of chances because he is legally allowed to divorce his wife
three times. After the third divorce, if the former husband regrets his decision and
wants to take his wife back, he first has to make his former wife marry another husband
— whom he has to procure for her. This procured husband is known as the ‘the
intervening husband’ (muḥallil/*zōǧ it-taḥlīl). When this muḥallil husband divorces
her, then the previous husband is allowed to remarry his divorced wife once again. The
comedy drama discusses the issue of verbal divorce, the extent of leniency in the
provisions of divorce and the circumvention of the law and sharīʿa by men.
Unfortunately, the woman surrenders to this, to the ideas of society that compel her
to consent, so that her children do not get scattered. The film was produced in 1985,
based on a script, scenario and dialogue by Helmy Salem, directed by Adel Sadiq and
starring Adel Emam, Fouad Al-Mohandes and Leila Alawi.
The same issue is discussed in the film Al-Sayyid Qeshta [Hippopotamus], a tragedy,
in which the director merges the dream of an eastern man of having a son, with the
issue of the intervening husband to circumvent the law and sharīʿa due to the
perpetration of three divorces by the man. The film was produced in 1985 by Ahmed
Abdel Salam, directed by Ibrahim Afifi, and starred Adel Adham and Elham Shaheen.

2.2. Housing rights and divorce
Egyptian drama has also addressed the important issue of the absolute right to retain
the marital apartment, a situation that creates problems after divorce. One of the most
famous films that discusses this with comic irony is al-Shaqqa min Ḥaqq al-Zawja
[The Wife Has the Right to Retain the Apartment]. It was produced in 1985, with a
scenario and dialogue by Faraj Ismail, directed by Faraj Ismail, and starring Mahmoud
Abdel Azeez and Maaly Zayed. The movie revolves around a newly married couple. The
couple has to navigate financial problems and face the interference of the bride’s
mother, which leads to arguments. Divorce is encouraged by the bride’s mother and a
dispute over the ownership of the shared apartment arises. After the film was shown,
it achieved critical acclaim and a women's union submitted a request for
recommendations to the Legal Committee of the parliament, to make amendments to
the Personal Status Law on the issue of home ownership post-divorce. The law allows
the wife to remain in the apartment until the end of the 15-year custody period. The
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film was successful in activating the addition of an important clause in recent marriage
contracts: the option to determine who will have the sole right to use the marital home
in the event of divorce.
Another film also addressed the same problem, but from a dramatic angle, to reveal
the negative aspects of this law, namely that it stipulates the wife had the right to
remain in the marital home provided she has sole custody of children by her exhusband. If she does not, she has no right to the dwelling. The film, Imraʾa Muṭallaqa
[A Divorced Woman], produced in 1986 and directed by Ashraf Fahmy is based on a
script by Hassan Shah and a screenplay and dialogue by Mustafa Muharram, and
starred Najlaa Fathi, Samira Ahmed, and Mahmoud Yassin. It is about a husband who
divorced his wife after 18 years of marriage. The marriage did not produce any
children. The woman helped to purchase the marital home but without documentary
evidence she cannot show proof of purchase. The man marries his secretary and the
first wife discovers that she is pregnant and thus moves back into her home with her
husband and his new wife. After she has an abortion, her husband evicts her and she
is forced to marry an illiterate man for shelter. In a strong dramatic mirroring of
injustice against women, the movie discusses the issue of divorce without the wife’s
consent, the loss of proof of her material rights to ownership of the apartment, and
that the fate of any wife who has no children at the time of her divorce is homelessness.

2.3. Divorce initiated by the wife (khulʿ)
The influence of Urīdu Ḥallan did not stop in the 1970s and 1980s, but extended to the
issuing of the Khulʿ Law in Egypt, which was issued according to Law No. 1 of 2000
on January 29, 2000, where Article 20 stipulated that:
The couple have to make an agreement between with each
other over khul', if they do not agree on it, and the wife requests it,
she will redeem herself and dislocate her husband by relinquishing
all of her legal and financial rights, and she returns to him the dowry
that he had given her, and the court rules to divorce her from him.
This law inspired the great scriptwriter Waheed Hamid to write the first film to discuss
this law in a comical and ironical form: Muḥamī Khulʿ [The Khulʿ Lawyer]. The film
was produced in 2002, directed by Mohamed Yassin, and starred Hani Ramzy, Dalia
Al-Behairi, and Hassan Hosni. It cynically addressed the request of a woman for khul'
for petty and irresponsible reasons, as well as the ability of her lawyer to circumvent
the law to free her from her husband who refused to divorce her. The second film to
discuss the law of khul' in a sarcastic way is Urīdu Khulʿan [I Want Khulʿ]. The film
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follows a music schoolteacher who is mistreated by her husband. She requests a
divorce, but he refuses, which forces her to file a suit in court, making her the first
woman to file for divorce since the issuance of the law. The film was produced in 2005,
written and screened by Ahmed Awwad and Mohamed Salah Al-Zahar, directed by
Ahmed Awwad, and starred Hala Shiha and Ashraf Abdel Baqi.
It is worth noting that the law of khulʿ in Egypt has been fought since it was passed by
fossilised male minds. Twenty years after the passing of this law, there are voices
calling for its abolition. Indeed, some members of parliament have submitted bills to
amend and restrict it, and have even requested its abolition, but until now, these
requests have not been discussed. The story of a woman who frees herself from her
husband according to law hurts many people who hold reactionary ideas. Even though
the woman’s right to divorce through khulʿ has been enshrined in legislation, these
ideas are still resisted and rejected. Nonetheless, we hope that the Egyptian legislator
will preserve this important legal acquisition of Egyptian women.

2.4. Marital obedience / Bayt al-ṭāʿa
We will now examine another law that represents, in my opinion, one of the worst laws
in the list of personal laws in Egyptian courts, the bayt al-ṭāʿa law (house of
obedience). This law requires a wife to live forcibly in a house owned by her husband,
even if she refuses to continue marriage, with the allegation and legal and legitimate
accusation by her husband that she does not obey him and breaks his rules and
regulations. A request to cancel it was presented to parliament in January 2020, but
this has yet to be discussed. I hope for the day that legal efforts succeed in repealing
this law, as it forces a woman to stay with a husband whom she hates psychologically
and physically. The cinema succeeded in discussing this in a successful and dramatic
manner. Unfortunately, this law is used by some men to humiliate their wives rather
than to discipline them, which is contrary to what many of them claim. We recall the
movie Barīq ʿAynayk [The Light of Your Eyes], produced in 1982, which was based on
a script by Samira Mohamed, directed by Mohamed Abdel Aziz, with screenplay and
dialogue by Ahmed Saleh, and starring Madiha Kamel, Nour Al Sharif and Hussein
Fahmy. The film tells of an air hostess who marries a pilot without knowing that he is
already married to his cousin and that he has a child by her. She requests a divorce
from him, but he refuses and, on one of his trips, the plane crashes and he cannot be
found. The air hostess then meets another man and marries him. One day, she is
surprised by the return of her husband who opposes her current marriage and files a
lawsuit requesting her to return to the house of obedience. After he wins the case, he
demands that his wife live with him, by the force of law, in an old, wretched house
prepared specifically for her humiliation. With impressive drama, the film discusses
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the disadvantages of The House of Obedience Law and the extent of the injustices that
a woman faces due to the implementation of this law.
Another film that discusses the same law and the problem of customary marriage
(zawāǧ ʿurfī) and its disadvantages, is the movie Indhār bi-l-Ṭaʿa [Obedience
Warning]. Produced in 1993, with a script, scenario, and dialogue by Khaled Al-Banna,
directed by Atef Al-Tayeb, it stars Layla Alawi and Mahmoud Hamida. The film is a
love story between a poor girl and a lawyer, who decide to perform a customary
marriage until the financial conditions of the lawyer improve. However, the girl is
subjected to pressure from her family to marry a rich relative of hers. She yields to her
family and agrees to the marriage with the rich relative. When the lawyer discovers the
new marriage, he files a case to establish the existing customary marriage between
them and requests her return to the conjugal house, the house of obedience.

2.5. Customary marriage / Zawāǧ ʿurfī
Customary marriage was discussed also in television drama, which addressed its status
in Egyptian law, and how a wife's rights are lost through it. In particular, drama
considered the severity of its effects on society and the damages that a woman suffers
from this type of marriage. The successful television drama, Ǧawāz ʿalá Waraq
Sūlīfān [A Marriage on Wrapping Paper], also discussed this phenomenon clearly and
was itself widely discussed, earning for television drama a reputation for engaging with
complex issues and having an impact on the public debate—the series was discussed
in the press and on TV programmes. It was a warning bell to realise the contours of
the phenomenon of customary marriage as the marriage that takes place between
young university students. It was produced in 1998 by Egyptian TV, based on a script,
scenario, and dialogue by Iqbal Baraka, directed by Ashraf Al-Ghazali and starring
Mona Zaki and Ahmed El-Sakka.
On the other hand, customary marriage is considered a circumvention of the
marriageable age of girls, set by Egyptian law at 18 years of age. Unfortunately, many
poor families force their young girls to marry earlier than is allowed, through
customary marriage. Here it is clear how customs and traditions govern and the law is
rejected, and even circumvented. The exposure of these young girls to early marriages
brings with it great physical and psychological damage. One of the most dramatic
works that discussed these two issues together is al-Qāṣirāt [Underage]. A 2013
production, based on a script, scenario and dialogue by Samah Al-Hariri, directed by
Majdi Abu Amira, it starred Salah Al-Saadani and Dalia Al-Buhairi.
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Besides this, there are other societal reasons that push people to resort to customary
marriage (ʿurfī marriage), For example, a widow who wants to marry again without
losing her deceased husband's pension. Here we should demand a change in the law
in favour of widowed women, to prevent them from rushing into marriage in this way.
Another example of customary marriage is where young people want to have a
relationship with a kind of religious legitimacy without incurring the huge expenses of
the conventional form of marriage. Here we are prompted to talk about the somewhat
exaggerated costs of completing a marriage in our Arab country. A final example of
customary marriage is for the purpose of pleasure and paying money in exchange for
this, which is a form of sexual exploitation of women.

2.6. Honour and gender discrimination
In conclusion, when speaking of the most important films that have affected family
laws, which have provided fertile grounds for drama, I would like to mention an
especially important film presented by Egyptian cinema. This is in order to discuss the
issue that this film addresses, namely the extent of the cruelty and discrimination of
the penal law, which rules differently for men and women in regard to honour issues.
The film ʿAfwan ya ayyuhā ʾl-Qānūn [Excuse Me, Law!], produced in 1985, discussed
the issue of adultery. In this film, a woman was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment
with enforced hard labour, while for the same crime, a man is charged with only a
misdemeanour. There is obvious discrimination between them, and with the passage
of time, continuous discrimination against the woman remains. The Egyptian law
currently defines the punishment for adultery, as stated in Article 274 of the Penal
Code, thus: “A married woman whose adultery is proven is to be sentenced to
imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years, but her husband can stop the
implementation of this ruling by his consent to her living with him as she is”.
Article 277 stipulates: “Every husband who conducts adultery in the marital home, and
this matter has been proven by the wife’s lawsuit, is sentenced to imprisonment for a
period not exceeding six months”. The film is written and screened by Ibrahim Al-Muji
and directed by the bold director Enas Al-Deghaidy.

3. Conclusions
Concluding this presentation of the most important films that discuss various legal
issues related to family, I must mention to the social and media reactions to these
films. There are films that strongly attract the attention of the audience because of
their great importance in discussing a law that affects every family of its time. Such a
film is for example Urīdu Ḥallan, which had great societal impact and took its time to
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shed light on the issues of divorce and the tragedies that women endure. It gained
great press and media momentum, but the most important reaction from my
perspective, was the audience's sense of the drama depicted. There are films that are
shown and forgotten, but real drama that expresses the feelings and problems of
people exist in their memory forever and have a great place in their souls. I mentioned
earlier, for example, the films al-Shaqqa min Ḥaqq al-Zawǧa, Muḥāmī Khulʿ and
other films that people remember clearly and discuss among themselves. While media
and jouralistic reactions to films are a product of their time — that is: the time when
the films are screened — the ‘real’ quality of a film is always a function of its relevance,
its impact on viewers, and the specific mark it leaves on the history of cinema.
On the other hand, institutions tend to react quite rarely to films; in a very few, isolated
cases did films constitute a motive for institutional action and reform of laws, as
mentioned earlier.
This drama emerges from life and its cruelty. It also shows how the handling of this
cruelty differs from one artist to another, some of whom love to invite the public to
laugh at its misery using comedy and irony, and some of whom present it tragically in
a way that causes hearts to ache. However, the thing common to all of them is the
invitation to think about and change the negative ideas that are prevalent in society
and to try to amend laws. They also have a greater aim, which is that drama can urge
humans to have more humanity, compassion and mercy, to love justice and truth and
to respect the law.
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